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wiretap channels with three popular diversity combining schemes, namely maximal ratio combining,
selection combining, and equal gain combining at the legitimate receiver. For single input multiple output
wiretap channels, both exact and asymptotic expressions are derived for the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of these systems. The findings suggest that, compared with the scenario where all the channels
are independent, correlation of the main channels alone increases the SOP by a factor of 1/det(U),
where det(U) is the determinant of correlation matrix U . In contrast, in the high signal-to-noise ratio
regime at the legitimate receiver, correlation between the main channels and the eavesdropper channels
has a positive effect on SOP. Moreover, for multiple input and multiple output wiretap channels, the SOP
of two transmit antenna selection (TAS) schemes are analyzed for the considered correlated channel
model. The SOP relationship of the both TAS schemes is quantified by the secrecy array gain. Finally,
numerical simulations are conducted to corroborate the analytical results.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid penetration of wireless services into various aspects of the society, security
has become an increasing critical concern. Responding to this concern, physical layer security
(PLS) technique has emerged as a promising solution to provide secrecy communication, and has
gained tremendous research attention in recent years. Since the pioneer work of Bloch et al. [1],
who demonstrated that positive secrecy rate can be achieved regardless of the channel quality of
the legitimate link, different approaches have been proposed in the literature to further enhance
the secrecy performance of PLS. Among which, multiple antenna technology can provide the
diversity gain and is of particular interest.
A plethora of works have investigated the impact of multiple antennas on the secrecy perfor-
mance. For instance, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of single-input multiple-output (SIMO)
and multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channels was studied in [2] and [3], respectively.
Later on, the secrecy performance of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels
was investigated in [4], [5]. In these prior works, it is commonly assumed that the channels
are independent, which is a reasonable assumption when these multiple antennas are spaced
sufficiently apart. In practice, due to space constraint, these multiple antennas can be correlated.
In addition, the main channel and the eavesdropper channel can also be correlated when the
eavesdropper is close to the legitimate receiver.
Therefore, understanding the impact of correlation on the secrecy performance of multi-antenna
wiretap channels is of both theoretical and practical interests. By considering correlation at the
multi-antenna legitimate receiver only, the effect of antenna correlation on the secrecy perfor-
mance was investigated in [6], while the case with correlation at the multi-antenna eavesdropper
only was examined in [7]. In [8], the impact of equal antenna correlation at both the multi-antenna
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper on SOP was studied with maximum ratio combining (MRC).
Later on, the extension to the arbitrary antenna correlation case was considered in [9] and [10].
Moreover, with antenna correlation at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, the SOP
of transmit antenna selection (TAS) scheme was studied in [11].
In addition to the above works, which only focused on the antenna correlation, several works
also investigated the secrecy performance when the main channel and eavesdropper channel are
correlated. The secrecy capacity bounds for the correlated main and the eavesdropper channels
were derived in [12]. The authors in [13] studied the the secrecy performance over correlated
fading channels in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper. The secrecy performance over
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3correlated Nakagami-fading was recently presented in [14]. In [15], it was shown that the correla-
tion beteween the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper channels can benefit secrecy performance
in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Similarly, in the cooperative relaying systems,
it was shown that correlation between the relay-destination link and the relay-eavesdropper link
is beneficial for the SOP [16]. Later on, the impacts of correlation on the SOP for different
relay selection schemes were investigated in [17], where the authors showed that correlation can
improve the SOP for full relay selection and degrade the SOP for the partial relay selection. For
cognitive networks, the impact of correlation between the main channels and the eavesdropper
channels on SOP was investigated in [18]. Also, secrecy key generation was proposed to take
advantage of correltion between the main and eavesdropper channels [19].
However, one common limitation of the forementioned works is that they only considered
the scenario with correlation between single antenna receiver and single antenna eavesdropper
channels. In addition, the exact SOP gains due to correlation were not characterized. In modern
communication system, communication terminals are likely equipped with multiple antennas.
Therefore it is necessary to investigate the impact of correlation on SOP over multi-antenna
wiretap channels. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the secrecy performance of general
multi-antenna wiretap channels with arbitrary correlation between the main and eavesdropper’s
channels has not been well understood. Moreover, it is well known that the performance of
diversity reception over independent channels is better than that over correlated channels [20].
However whether the secrecy performance over correlated channels is superior or inferor to that
over independent channels is still an open question. Motivated by these, in this paper, we consider
a more comprehensive system model with generalized correlaton model. We systematically study
the effect of correlation on the SOP for the SIMO wiretap channels, and the relationship of SOP
over independent channeles and correlated channels is quantified by simple and meaningful
expressions. Furthermore, for a multi-anenna eavesdropper, we investigate the SOP of TAS
schemes for the MIMO wiretap channels. Specifically, the main contributions of the paper are
summarized as follows:
1. A joint probability density function (PDF) for a sum of correlated variables pertaining
to our system model is first derived. Since the traditional correlation matrix eigenvalue
decomposition technique [21] can not be used for SOP analysis in our scenario, we resort
to the correlation channel model presented in [22]- [23] to establish the correlation between
the main channels and the evaesdropper channels. All correlated channels are modeled as
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4a set of conditional independent channel gains. For this, the SOP can be derived by the
method of moment generation function and conditional probability density function.
2. For three popular diversity combining schemes: MRC, selection combining (SC), and equal
gain combining (EGC), simple asymptotic expressions are presented for the SOP of the
considered system. The result indicates that the correlation does not change the secrecy
diversity order. Moreover, the analytical findings suggest that, compared with the ideal case
where all the channels are independent, antenna correlation of the main channels (CMC)
increases the SOP by a factor of 1/ det(U) in the high SNR regime, where det(U) is the
determinant of the main channels correlation matrix U . In contrast, the correlation between
the main and eavesdropper channels (CMEC) is beneficial for SOP. When the average SNR
at the legitimate receiver is larger than that at the eavesdropper, the larger the correlation
coefficient is, the more SOP gains can be obtained. Moreover, depending on the correlation
coefficients, the combined effects due to correlation can either degrade or improve the SOP
performance.
3. For correlated MIMO wiretap channels, two different types of TAS schemes are studied,
depending on the availability of eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI). For both
cases, NE antennas are deployed at the eavesdropper, and the asymptotic SOP expressions
of all three different diversity combining schemes are presented. The findings suggest that
the considered TAS schemes achieve the same secrecy diversity order of MNt, where Nt is
the number of transmit antennas and M is the number of the receiver antennas. According
to the secrecy array gain, the SOP gap of two TAS schemes is quantified by a closed-form
expression and increases with Nt. Especially, when NE = 1, compared with case of TAS
with eavesdropper’s CSI, the SOP of the TAS without eavesdropper’s CSI deteriorates by
a factor of (MNt)!
(M !)Nt
.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model.
In Section III, assuming a single antenna at the transmitter, the asymptotic expressions of SOP
are derived. In Section IV, when multiple antennas are deployed at the transmitter and the
eavesdropper, the asymptotic SOP expressions of TAS are derived with or without eavesdropper’s
CSI. Simulation results are presented in Section V. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notations- Pr (·) denotes the probability of an event; fβ (·) is the PDF of random variable
(RV) β; Fβ (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of RV β; I0(·) is the modified
Bessel function of the first kind of order zero; φβ (s) is the moment generation function (MGF)
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5of β; E(·) is expected value of a RV; L−1(·) denotes the inverse Laplace transform; det (·) is the
determinant of a matrix; Γ(·) is the Gamma function; An m×m identity matrix is denoted by Im.
1F1(α; γ; z) denotes the confluent hypergeometric function. 2F1(α, β; γ; z) is the hypergeometric
function. En(·) is the exponential-integral function. For a vector x, xT denotes the transpose,
and xH denotes the conjugate transpose.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
E
B
Main channel
Eavesdropper channel
A
Fig. 1. System model of a multi-antenna secure communication systems
Consider a MIMO wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1, where the Alice or source node S
equipped with Nt antennas aims to establish a secure communication link with the legitimate
receiver B equipped with M antennas in the presence of eavesdropper E equipped with NE
antennas. All the channels are assumed to experience Rayleigh fading. When the signal is
transmitted by the n-th antenna, the received signal at the legitimate receiver can be expressed
as
ysn,B =
√
P0hsn,Bx+ nB, n = 1, · · · , Nt (1)
where x is the information symbol with unit power, P0 is the source transmit power, and hsn,B =
{hsn,b1 , hsn,b2 , · · · , hsn,bM}T is an M × 1 channel vector between the n-th transmitter antenna
and receiver. Also, hsn,bm (1 ≤ m ≤ M) is a complex Gaussian RV with mean zero and
variance
σ2s,b
2
. Finally, the M × 1 vector nB denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at legitimate receiver satisfying E
(
nBn
H
B
)
= IMN0, where N0 is the noise variance. Since the
legitimate receiver has multiple antennas, diversity combining techniques can be employed to
enhance the secrecy performance. Depending on the specific diversity combining schemes, the
SNR at legitimate receiver, γsn,B, takes different forms, which will be specified in the ensuing
section. Similarly, the received signal at the eavesdroppers can be expressed as
ysn,E =
√
P0hsn,Ex+ nE, n = 1, · · · , Nt (2)
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6where hsn,E =
{
hsn,e1 , hsn,e2 , · · · , hsn,eNE
}T
is the NE × 1 channel vector between the n-th
transmitter antenna and the eavesdropper; hsn,ek (1 ≤ k ≤ NE) is an AWGN RV with mean zero
and variance σ
2
s,e
2
; nE is an AWGN RV vector at the eavesdropper satisfying E
(
nBn
H
B
)
= INEN0.
When multiple antennas are deployed at the legitimate receiver, due to the space constraint,
the channels at multiple antennas are assumed to be correlated. In [22] and [24], the authors
noted that a set of related complex Gaussian RVs can be obtained by linearly combining a
set of independent Gaussian RVs. Then the correlated channel between the n-th antenna at the
transmitter and the m-th antenna at the legitimate receiver, hsn,bm , can be expressed as [23]
hsn,bm = σsn,bm
[(√
1− η2mXsn,bm + ηmXn,0
)
+i
(√
1− η2mYsn,bm + ηmYn,0
)]
,m = 1, · · · ,M (3)
where i =
√−1, −1 ≤ ηm ≤ 1, and Xsn,bm , Ysn,bm , Xn,0, Yn,0 are independent Gaussian RVs with
distribution N (0, 1/2). For any m,m′ ∈ {1, ...M}, E
(
Xsn,bmXsn,bm′
)
= E
(
Ysn,bmYsn,bm′
)
=
1
2
δm,m′ , where δu,v is the Kronecker delta function, i.e., δm,m′ = 1 for m = m′ and δm,m′ = 1 for
m 6= m′. Since the distance between the transmit antenna and the receive antenna is far greater
than that between any two transimt antennas in practice, we assume all tranmit antennas at the
legitimate receiver have the same correlation matrix, which is defined as
U =

1 ρb1,2 · · · ρb1,M
ρb1,2 1 · · · ρb2,M
...
... . . .
...
ρb1,M ρ
b
2,M · · · 1
 (4)
where the element ρbm,m′ (1 ≤ m ≤M, 1 ≤ m′ ≤M,m 6= m′) denotes the correlation coefficient
between the m-th and m′-th receive antenna at the legitimate receiver, and it is calculated as
ρbm,m′ =
E
(
hsn,bm , h
∗
sn,bm′
)
− E (hsn,bm)E
(
h∗sn,bm′
)
√
E (|hsn,bm|2)E
(
|hsn,bm′ |2
) = ηmηm′ (5)
When the eavesdropper is close to the legitimate receiver, the signal received at the legitimate
receiver can be correlated with signal at the eavesdropper. Also, when the eavesdropper lies in
the radio wave path of legitimated signal and the eavesdropper is less than 70-80 wavelengths
from the legitimate receiver (see [12] and reference therein), the received signal at the legitimate
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7receiver and the eavesdropper can be correlated. Thus, we can model the eavesdropper’s channel
as
hsn,ek = σs,e
[(√
1− λ2kXsn,ek + λkXn,0
)
+i
(√
1− λ2kYsn,ek + λkYn,0
)]
, k = 1, · · · , NE (6)
where−1 ≤ λk ≤ 1; Xsn,ek and Ysn,ek are independent Gaussian RVs with distributionN (0, 1/2).
In this paper, for analytical convenience, we assume the eavesdropper channels are equally
correlated, λk = λe. Thus, similar to (5), the correlation coefficient between hsn,eϑ and hsn,eϑ′
(1 ≤ ϑ ≤ NE) is
ρeϑ,ϑ′ = λ
2
e. (7)
As an important contribution of this work, we establish correlaion between the main channels
and the eavesdropper channels via the common variables Xn,0 and Yn,0 in both (3) and (6). As
a result, the correlation coefficient between hsn,bm and hsn,eϑ can be concisely expressed as
ρb,em,ϑ = ηmλe. (8)
To evaluate the secrecy performance for more general scenarios, classical information-theoretic
methods are often deployed [2]- [18]. For the information-theoretic secrecy evaluation, the SOP,
non-zero capacity rate, and average secrecy capacity are three popular and common metrics 1
[1]. Since we consider the case that the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable, and the probability
of non-zero secrecy rate can be easily obtained by the special case of SOP, we will employ
the SOP to evaluate the secrecy performance. When the n-th transmit antenna is selected, the
secrecy capacity is expressed as
Csn =
 log2 (1 + γsn,B)− log2 (1 + γsn,E) , γsn,B ≥ γsn,E0, γsn,B < γsn,E (9)
where γsn,B and γsn,E denote the SNR at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively.
The SOP is defined as the probability that Csn is less than a predetermined secrecy rate Rs. It
can be written as [26], [27]
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Csn < Rs)
= Pr
(
γsn,B < 2
Rs (1 + γsn,E)− 1
)
. (10)
In the remainder of the paper, the definition in (10) is used to evaluate the secrecy performance.
1It is worth noting that several new secrecy performance metrics have recently been proposed by taking into account of the
eavesdropper’s decodability of confidential messages [25].
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8III. SOP WITH SINGLE ANTENNA AT THE TRANSMITTER AND THE EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we analyze the SOP of a SIMO system, which may correspond to an uplink of
a cellular network, where the base station is equipped with multiple antennas, and the terminal is
often equipped with single antenna due to size and cost constraint. It is valuable to evaluate the
SOP performance of the SIMO system with a single-antenna eavesdropper, per the discussions
in [13]- [17]. Moreover, the case of multi-antenna eavesdopper will be considered in Section
IV. This section also forms the basis of analysis for TAS with or without eavesdropper’s CSI in
Section IV.
In particular, we consider three different diversity combining schemes adopted at the legitimate
receiver, namely, MRC, SC and EGC. Each combining scheme has its advantage and disad-
vantage. MRC requires accurate instantaneous CSI and can achieve the best performance. SC
compares all branches instantaneous CSI and has a simple structure. However, the performance
of SC is much lower than that of MRC. To compromise the system performance and complexity,
EGC is a suitable choice. For the correlated SIMO wiretap channels, we consider these three
popular diversity combining schemes at the legitimate receiver. Next, the impacts of correlation
on SOP for three combining schemes are analytically quantified in detail.
A. MRC at the Legitimate Receiver
When MRC is adopted at the legitimate receiver, the SNR is given by
γMRCsn,B = γsn,b1 + γsn,b2 + · · ·+ γsn,bM (11)
where γsn,bm =
P0|hsn,bm|2
N0
(1 ≤ m ≤ M ) is exponentially distributed with mean γ¯sn,bm =
P0σ2sn,bm
N0
. Since the antennas are co-located, it is reasonable to assume that the main channels at
the legitimate receiver have the same average SNR γ¯sn,bm = γ¯B.
1) Exact SOP: When the main channels and the eavesdropper channel are correlated. The SNR
at the destination has been presented in (11). Since γMRCsn,B and γsn,E are correlated, and all the
variables in (11) and γsn,E are correlated, it is challenging to derive the exact SOP for arbitrarily
correlated fading channels. We only discuss the exact SOP for equally correlated case. We can
resort to the conditional CDF to derive the exact SOP. We assume T = X2n,0 + Y
2
n,0, Xn,0 = x0,
and Yn,0 = y0. If the main channels are equally correlated, i. e., ρbm,m′ = ρ, conditioned on
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9x20 + y
2
0 = t, γ
MRC
sn,B has a noncentral chi-square distribution χ2M
(√
Mγ¯Bρ2t,
γ¯B(1−ρ2)
2
)
, and the
conditional CDF of γMRCsn,B is given by
FγMRCsn,B |T (x |t) = 1−QM
(√
2Mρ2t
1− ρ2 ,
√
2x
γ¯B (1− ρ2)
)
(12)
where QM (·, ·) denotes the M -th order Marcum Q-function, and it is defined as [22]
QM (a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
x
(
x
a
)M−1
exp
(
−
(
x2 + a2
2
))
IM−1 (ax) dx. (13)
Similarly, conditioned on x20 + y
2
0 = t, γsn,E has a noncentral chi-square distribution
χ2
(√
γ¯Eλ2et,
γ¯E(1−λ2e)
2
)
, and the conditional CDF of γsn,E is given by
Fγsn,E |T (y |t) = 1−Q1

√√√√ 2λ2et
1− λ2e
,
√
2y
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
 (14)
where Q1(·, ·) denotes the first-order Marcum Q-function. Differentiating (14) with respect to y,
the conditional PDF of γsn,E is derived as
fγsn,E |T (y |t) =
exp
(
− λ2et
1−λ2
)
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
exp
(
− y
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
)
I0
2
√√√√ λ2ety
γ¯E(1− λ2e)2
 . (15)
According to (10), (12), and (15), the SOP of MRC is given by
Pout MRC (Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−t) Pr
(
γMRCsn,B ≤ 2Rs (γsn,E + 1)− 1 |t
)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−tdt
∫ ∞
0
1−QM
√2Mρ2t
1− ρ2 ,
√√√√2 (2Rs (y + 1)− 1)
γ¯B (1− ρ2)

× exp
(
− λ2et
1−λ2
)
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
exp
(
− y
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
)
I0
2
√√√√ λ2ety
γ¯E(1− λ2e)2
 dy. (16)
By using the function MARCUMQ provided in Matlab, the exact SOP of MRC can be obtained.
2) Asymptotic SOP: If the correlation coefficients are arbitrary, it is challenging to obtain the
conditional CDF or PDF of γMRCsn,B and the direct method to derive the SOP is intractable. We
resort to the conditional MGF to obtain the asymptotic SOP with arbitrary correlation at the
legitimate receiver. As γ¯B → ∞, it corresponds to the scenario where the main channels have
good quality while the eavesdropper’s channel is severely blocked due to severe shadowing. The
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asymptotic conditional PDF of γMRCsn,B is derived in Appendix A. According to (15) and (69), as
γ¯B →∞, we can obtain the asymptotic SOP of MRC as
Pout MRC
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−t)dt
∫ ∞
0
(
γMRCsn,B ≤ 2Rs (1 + y)− 1
)
fγsn,E (y |t)dy
=
γ¯ME
det (U) γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!

1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m

k(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k(
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
(17)
where in obtaining the last equality the following integral identity∫ ∞
0
exp (−µx)I0
(
2
√
υx
)
dx =
1
µ
exp
(
υ
µ
)
(18)
is used [28]. In (17), o(·) denotes higher order terms; det (U) is the determinant of matrix U ,
and it is given by [29]
det (U) =
M∏
m=1
(
1− η2m
)(
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1− η2m
)
. (19)
It can be seen from (17) that the diversity order is M . In addition, if γ¯E  1, eq. (17) can be
further simplified as
Pout MRC (Rs) ' 1
det (U)
(
2Rs γ¯E
γ¯B
)M 
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m

M
. (20)
Since the asymptotic SOP with γ¯E  1 can be easily obtained by the aysmptotic SOP, in the
remainder of the paper, unless otherwise stated, we will not derive the asymptotic SOPs with
γ¯E  1 .
B. SC at the Legitimate Receiver
When the SC is applied, the SNR at the multi-antennas legitimate receiver is given by
γSCsn,B = max (γsn,b1 , γsn,b2 , · · · γsn,bM ) . (21)
1) Exact SOP: When SC is applied at the legitimate receiver, the SNR at the legitimate
receiver has been given in (21). Since the main and eavesdropper’s channels are correlated, similar
to the case of MRC, the conditional CDF approach is used. For fixed Xn,0 = x0, Yn,0 = y0, the
conditional hsn,bm is complex Gaussian distributed with mean
√
γ¯Bη2m (x0 + iy0) and variance
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
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γ¯B(1−η2m)
2
. |hsn,bm|2 obeys a noncentral chi-square distribution χ2
(√
γ¯Bη2m (x
2
0 + y
2
0),
γ¯B(1−η2m)
2
)
.
Assuming T = X2n,0 + Y
2
n,0 with x
2
0 + y
2
0 = t, the conditional CDF of γsn,bm can be obtained as
Fγsn,bm|T (x| t) = Pr (γsn,bm ≤ x |t)
= 1−Q1

√√√√ 2η2mt
1− η2m
,
√
2x
γ¯B (1− η2m)
 . (22)
According to (21) and (65), the conditional CDF of γSCsn,B is expressed as
FγSCsn,B |T (x|t) =
M∏
m=1
1−Q1

√√√√ 2η2mt
1− η2m
,
√
2x
γ¯B (1− η2m)
. (23)
The SOP of SC is given by
Pout SC (Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
e−t Pr
(
γSCsn,B ≤
(
2Rs (γsn,E + 1)− 1
)
|t
)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−tdt
∫ ∞
0
M∏
m=1
Q1

√√√√ 2η2mt
1− η2m
,
√√√√2 (2Rs (y + 1)− 1)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
fγsn,E (y |t)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
M∏
m=1
Q1

√√√√ 2η2mt
1− η2m
,
√√√√2 (2Rs (y + 1)− 1)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
 exp(− y
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
)
I0

√√√√ 2λ2et
1− λ2e
y
dy
×
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− t
1−λ2e
)
γ¯B (1− λ2e)
dt. (24)
2) Asymptotic SOP: As β → 0+, QM(α, β) can be approximated as [30]
QM (α, β) ≈ 1− β
2M
2MM !
exp
(
−α
2
2
)
. (25)
As γ¯B →∞, substituting (25) into (24), the asymptotic SOP is derived as
Pout SC
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
M !γ¯ME
det (U) γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
(
2Rs
)k
(M − k)!

1 +
M∑
k=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m

k(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
.
(26)
It can be seen from (26) that the diversity order is still M .
C. EGC at the Legitimate Receiver
When the EGC is applied, the received signals are first co-phased and then summed to form
the resultant output. The SNR at the multi-antenna legitimate receiver is given by
γEGCsn,B =
P0
(
M∑
m=1
|hsn,bm |
)2
MN0
=
(
M∑
m=1
√
γsn,bm
)2
M
. (27)
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Since γEGCsn,B is correlated with γE , it is challenging to derive γ
EGC
sn,B directly. Different from the
case of MRC, we derive the conditional PDF of γEGCsn,B in Appendix B. Then according to (10),
(15), and (76), the asymptotic SOP of EGC is derived as
Pout EGC (Rs)
γ¯B→∞
= Pr
(
γEGCsn,B ≤
(
2Rs (γsn,E + 1)− 1
))
=
∫ ∞
0
e−tdt
∫ ∞
0
fγsn,E|T (y| t)
∫ 2Rs (y+1)−1
0
fγEGCsn,B |T (x| t) dxdy
=
M ! (2M)M γ¯ME
(2M)! det (U) γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!

1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m

k (
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k (
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
.
(28)
It can be observed from (28) that the diversity order is still M .
D. Special Case of λe = 0
As λe = 0, the main channels and the eavesdropper channel are independent. Eqs. (17), (26),
and (28) are, respectively, simplified to
PCout MRC
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
γ¯ME
γ¯MB det (U)
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k(
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
(29)
PCout SC
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
M !γ¯ME
γ¯MB det (U)
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k(
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
(30)
PCout EGC (Rs)
γ¯B→∞
=
M ! (2M)M γ¯ME
(2M)! det (U) γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k (
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
. (31)
a) η2m = 1: When η
2
m = 1 (1 ≤ m ≤M) or det (U) = 0, the main channels are completely
correlated. In this case, the SOP of different combining schemes is given by
PCout
η2m=1
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
γ¯E
εγ¯B
(
2Rs +
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)
. (32)
In (32), as MRC and EGC are deployed at the legitimate receiver, ε = M . As SC is deployed,
ε = 1. It is obvious from (32), the secrecy diversity order decreases to unity when the main
channels are completely correlated.
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b) ηm = 0: When λe = 0, and ηm = 0, namely det(U) = 1, all the channels are
independent. Eqs. (17), (26), and (28) are, respectively, simplified as
P Iout MRC
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
γ¯ME
γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−m(
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
(33)
P Iout SC
γ¯B→∞
(Rs) =
M !γ¯ME
γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k(
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
(34)
P Iout EGC (Rs)
γ¯B→∞
=
M ! (2M)M γ¯ME
(2M)!γ¯MB
M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k (
2Rs
)k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
. (35)
Remark 1: Comparing the case of having only antenna correlation at the legitimate receiver
with the case where all the channels are independent, we reveal that antenna correlation at the
legitimate receiver increases the SOP by a factor of 1/ det(U). Since det (U) ≤ 1 [31], [32],
antenna correlation at the legitimate receiver deteriorates the SOP. The higher antenna correlation
becomes, the worse SOP is obtained. Moreover, it can be seen that regardless which diversity
reception is deployed at the legitimate receiver, CMC does not change the secrecy diversity
order M . In addition, it can be seen that as γ¯B →∞, no matter whether the main channels are
correlated or not, the SOP of SC is M ! times that of MRC, and the SOP of EGC is M !(2M)
M
(2M)!
times that of MRC.
E. Comparison of CMEC With CMC
Comparing (17), (26), (28) with(29),(30), (31), as γ¯E  1, for the three combining schemes
we can find
lim
γ¯B→∞
Pout (Rs)
PCout (Rs)
=

1 +
M∑
k=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1 +
M∑
k=1
η2m
1−η2m

M
. (36)
Because
1+
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1+
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m
≤ 1, Pout MRC (Rs) ≤ PCout MRC (Rs), Pout SC (Rs) ≤ PCout SC (Rs), and
Pout EGC (Rs) ≤ PCout EGC (Rs) .
Remark 2: we can conclude that in the high SNR regime at the legitimate receiver, the corre-
lation between the main channels and the eavesdropper channel improves the SOP performance.
While similar conclusion was made for the single-antenna main channel and the single-antenna
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eavesdropper channel [15]. We emphasize that the same conclusion can be made for multi-
anntenna main channels here, as well as for multi-antenna evesdropper channels in Section IV.
This phenomenon can be intuitively understood by analyzing the SOP under the extreme case
that the main and eavesdropper channels are fully correlated, where the instantaneous SNR at the
legitimate receiver is always larger than that at the eavesdropper, and the best SOP performance
can be obtained. Note that (36) is obtained when γ¯B approaches infinity. Hence, our statement
holds under the condition that the average SNR γ¯B at the legitimate receiver is much larger than
the average SNR at the eavesdropper γ¯E .
F. Comparison of CMEC with Independent of All The Channels
Comparing (17) with (33), (26) with (34), and (28) with (35), as γ¯E  1, for the three
combining schemes, the relationship between the SOP under the case when all the channels are
correlated and the SOP under the case when all the channels are independent is given by
lim
γ¯B→∞
Pout (Rs)
P Iout (Rs)
=
1
det (U)

1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1 +
M∑
k=1
η2m
1−η2m

M
. (37)
Remark 3: Setting P Iout (Rs) as the reference, it can be easily concluded from (37) that, in
the high SNR regime, the SOP decreases with λ2e. Moreover, note that in (37) the first part
1
det(U)
≥ 1, and the second part
1+
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m
1+
M∑
k=1
η2m
1−η2m

M
≤ 1. This leads to Pout(Rs)
P Iout(Rs)
≤ 1 when λ2e is
large and the main channels are slightly correlated. In other words, the combined effects of the
antenna correlation at the legitimate receiver (ηm) and the correlation between the main channels
and eavesdropper channel (λe) can either degrade or improve the SOP performance.
G. Lower and Upper SOP Bounds with Correlation Between The Main and Eavesdropper
Channels
In Remark 2, we have known the SOP decreases with λ2e, when the main and eavesdropper
channels are correlated. Then with fixed antenna correlation matrix U and the fixed average
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channel gains γ¯B and γ¯E , the lower bound of SOP can be obtained by letting λ2e = 1. For the
special case of λ2e = 1, as γ¯B →∞, the asymptotic SOP of MRC is recalculated as
Pout MRC = Pr
(
γmrcsn,B ≤ 2Rs (γE + 1)− 1
)
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
∫ 2Rs (γ¯Et+1)−1
0
fγB mrc (x) dx
=
γ¯ME
γ¯MB det (U )
M∑
k=0
1(
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m
)k 1(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k
2Rsk + o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
. (38)
Similarly, the asymptotic SOPs of SC and EGC are rewritten as
Pout SC =
M !γ¯ME
γ¯MB det (U)
M∑
k=0
1(
1 +
M∑
k=1
η2m
1−η2m
)k 1(M − k)!
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k
2Rsk + o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
(39)
and
Pout EGC =
M ! (2M)M γ¯ME
(2M)!γ¯MB det (U)
M∑
k=0
2Rsk
(M − k)!
(
1 +
M∑
k=1
η2m
1−η2m
)k
(
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k
+ o
(
1
γ¯MB
)
.
(40)
It can be observed that (38), (39), and (40) are respectively the lower SOP bounds for MRC, SC
and EGC, when the main and eavesdropper channels are correlated. Moreover, these equations
coincide with (17), (26) and (28) with λ2e = 1. Also, the upper SOP bounds correspond to the
case of λ2e = 0, and they have been obtained in (29), (30), and (31).
IV. SOP OF TAS WITH THE MULTI-ANTENNA EAVESDROPPER
Multiple antennas technique can be applied at both the base station and the terminals at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. It is therefore necessary to investigate the SOP of a
MIMO system. In addition, considering that the multi-antenna eavesdropper tries to overhear the
legitimate information as much as possible, we only consider the case when MRC is deployed
at the eavesdropper. Moverover, due to constraints on cost and complexity, a single RF chain is
equipped at the transmitter. Only one transmit antenna is selected to forward the information.
It is worth mentioning that the TAS technique has been approved by IEEE 802.16 for WiMAX
and LTE-Advanced [33] since it can achieve full diversity at low cost and low implementation
complexity in Rayleigh fading channels [34]. Hence, under both cases of with or without
eavesdropper’s CSI, the asymptotic SOP expressions of TAS/MRC, TAS/SC, and TAS/EGC
are derived over correlated Raleigh fading channels in the following. We comment that while
the SOP for TAS with diversity receptions was studied for correlatd legitimate channels and
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correlated eavesdropper channels [11], the effects of correaltions between the multi-branch main
channels and the multi-branch eavesdropper channels have not been investigated.
A. Without Eavesdropper’s CSI
When the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable to the transmitter, the transmit antenna having
the maximum SNR at the legitimate receiver is selected, and it can be expressed as [35]
n∗ = arg max
1≤n≤Nt
γsn,B (41)
where γsn,B is determined by the specific combining scheme deployed at the legitimate receiver.
When MRC, SC, and EGC are applied, γsn,B is respectively denoted by γMRCsn,B , γ
SC
sn,B and γ
EGC
sn,B .
1) MRC at the Legitimate Receiver: Note when the eavesdropper’s channel is independent
of the main channels, the selected antenna n∗ is a random antenna for eavesdropper E. But
when the eavesdropper’s channel is correlated with the main channels, the SNR at the eaves-
dropper γMRCsn∗ ,E is correlated with the SNR at the legitimate receiver γ
MRC
sn∗ ,B . Then conditioned
on x20 + y
2
0 = t, the SNR at the eavesdropper, γ
MRC
sn,E , has a noncentral chi-square distribution
χ2NE
(√
NE γ¯Eλ2et,
γ¯E(1−λ2e)
2
)
, and the conditional PDF of γMRCsn,E is given by
fγMRCsn,E |T (y| t) =
exp
(
−y+NE γ¯Eλ2et
γ¯E(1−λ2e)
)
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
(
y
NE γ¯Eλ2et
)NE−1
2
INE−1
2
√√√√ NEλ2ety
γ¯E (1− λ2e)2
 . (42)
The conditional PDF of γMRCsn∗ ,B has been derived in (69). Then with the help of (42) and (69),
the joint PDF of γMRCsn∗ ,B and γ
MRC
sn∗ ,E is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The joint PDF of γMRCsn∗ ,B and γ
MRC
sn∗ ,E can be obtained as
fγMRCsn∗,B ,γ
MRC
sn∗,E
(x, y) =
(
1
Γ (M + 1) det (U)
)Nt−1 Nt M∏
m=1
1
1−η2m
(
1
1−λ2e
)NE
Γ (M) γ¯MNtB γ¯
NE
E Γ (NE)α
xMNt−1
× yNE−1 exp
(
− y
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
)
1F1
(
1;NE;
NEλ
2
ey
αγ¯E (1− λ2e)2
)
+ o
(
xMNt−1
γ¯MNtB
)
. (43)
Proof: The derivation is presented in Appendix C. According to (10) and (43), the asymptotic
SOP of TAS/MRC is calculated as
P TASout MRC (Rs) = Pr
(
γMRCsn∗ ,B + 1
γMRCsn∗ ,E + 1
≤ 2Rs
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (y+1)−1
0
fγMRCsn∗ ,B ,γ
MRC
sn∗ ,E
(x, y)dxdy
=
1
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m) det (U)Nt−1 ΓNt (M + 1) Γ (NE)αγ¯MNtB
MNt∑
ω=0
(
MNt
ω
)(
2Rs − 1
)MNt−ω
× Γ (NE + ω)
(
2Rs γ¯E
(
1− λ2e
))ω
2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
)
+ o
(
1
γ¯MNtB
)
. (44)
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As ηm = 0, λe = 0, det (U) = 1, and all channels are independent, eq. (44) is reduced to [35,
eq. (27)] over Rayleigh fading. This demonstrates the generality for our result. As γ¯E  1, the
asymptotic SOP of TAS/MRC is rewritten as
P TASout MRC (Rs) =
Γ (MNt +NE)
(
γ¯E2
Rs (1− λ2e)
)MNt
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m) (det (U))Nt−1 ΓNt (M + 1) Γ (NE)αγ¯MNtB
× 2F1
(
1,MNt +NE;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
)
+ o
(
1
γ¯MNtB
)
. (45)
Specially, as NE = 1, no combining schemes are deployed at the eavesdropper,
1F1
(
1;NE;
NEλ
2
ey
αγ¯E(1−λ2e)2
)
= exp
(
NEλ
2
ey
αγ¯E(1−λ2e)2
)
. The asymptotic SOP of TAS with single antenna
eavesdropper is given by
P TASout MRC
NE=1
(Rs) =
Γ (MNt + 1)
(
γ¯E2
Rs (1− λ2e)
)MNt
ΓNt (M + 1) detNt (U) γ¯MNtB

M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m +
λ2e
1−λ2e
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m + 1

MNt
+ o
(
1
γ¯MNtB
)
.
(46)
According to (45) and (46), the impact of the eavesdropper antenna number NE on SOP is
P TASout MRC (Rs)
P TASout MRC
NE=1
(Rs)
=
Γ(MNt+NE)
(
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m
+1
)MNt+1
Γ(NE)
(
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m
+
λ2e
1−λ2e
)MNt 2F1
(
1,MNt +NE;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
)
. (47)
It can be easily found that the secrecy array gain decreases with an increase of NE . In addition,
since the impact of correlation coefficient on SOP has been analyzed and has the similar result
as single-antenna eavesdropper, we do not repeat the analysis.
2) SC at the Legitimate Receiver: When SC is applied at the legitimate receiver, we can use
the same method as described in Appendix C to obtain the joint PDF of γSCsn∗ ,B and γ
MRC
sn∗ ,E . The
approximate SOP of TAS/SC is given by
P TASout SC (Rs) =
1
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m) det (U)Nt−1 Γ (NE)αγ¯MNtB
MNt∑
ω=0
(
MNt
ω
)(
2Rs − 1
)MNt−ω
× Γ (NE + ω)
(
2Rs γ¯E
(
1− λ2e
))ω
2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
)
+ o
(
1
γ¯MNtB
)
. (48)
As ηm = 0 and λe = 0, eq. (48) is reduced to [35, eq. (33)] over Rayleigh fading. This
demonstrates the generality for our result.
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3) EGC at the Legitimate Receiver: When EGC is applied at the legitimate receiver, we can
also use the same method as described in Appendix C to obtain the joint PDF of γEGCsn∗ ,B and
γsn∗ ,E . The approximate SOP of TAS/EGC is given by
P TASout EGC (Rs) =
(2M)MNt
ΓNt (2M + 1)
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m) detNt−1 (U) Γ (NE)αγ¯MNtB
×
MNt∑
ω=0
(
MNt
ω
)
Γ (NE + ω)
(
2Rs − 1
)MNt−ω (
2Rs γ¯E
(
1− λ2e
))ω
× 2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
)
+ o
(
1
γ¯MNtB
)
. (49)
Remark 4: From (44), (48), and (49), the diversity order for three combining schems is NtM .
Moreover, P TASout MRC (Rs) > P
TAS
out EGC (Rs) > P
TAS
out SC (Rs). Also P
TAS
out MRC (Rs) /P
TAS
out EGC (Rs) =
(Γ(2M+1))Nt
(2M)MNtΓNt (M+1)
and P TASout MRC (Rs) /P
TAS
out SC (Rs) =
1
ΓNt (M+1)
. The gap for different combining
schemes does not depend on the eavesdropper’s antenna number NE . Especailly, as Nt = 1 and
NE = 1, eqs. (44), (48), and (49) are simplified to (17), (26), and (28). As λe = 1, eqs. (44),
(48), and (49) are simplified to (38), (39), and (40).
B. With Eavesdropper’s CSI
When the eavesdropper’s CSI is available to the transmitter, the transmit antenna having the
largest secrecy capacity is selected, and it can be expressed as [36], [37]
n∗ = arg max
1≤n≤Nt
log2
(
1 + γsn,B
1 + γsn,E
)
. (50)
Though secrecy outage may be avoided when the eavesdropper’s CSI is available and the
transmitter can adaptively adjust the transmission parameter such as transmission rate, such
implementation can significantly increase the system complexity. Therefore, the transmitter may
still adopt the constant rate transmission scheme, and secrecy outage can still occur.
1) MRC at the Legitimate Receiver: Since the antenna is selected according to the secrecy
capacity, and the SNRs at the legitimate receiver from different antenna are independent, the
asymptotic SOP of TAS/MRC is given by
P TAS
′
out MRC (Rs) =
Nt∏
n=1
Pr (Csn ≤ Rs) (51)
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where Pr (Csn ≤ Rs) denotes the SOP of random TAS, and it can be calculated as
Pr (Csn ≤ Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
dy
∫ 2Rs (y+1)−1
0
fγsn,B ,γsn,E (x, y)dx
=
1
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)Γ (M + 1) Γ (NE) γ¯MB α
M∑
ω=0
(
M
ω
)(
2Rs − 1
)M−ω
× Γ (NE + ω)
(
γ¯E2
Rs
(
1− λ2e
))ω
2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
)
+ o
(
γ¯−MB
)
. (52)
Substituting (52) into (53), the asymptotic SOP of TAS/MRC with eavesdropper’s CSI is
P TAS
′
out MRC (Rs) =
1(
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)
)Nt
ΓNt (M + 1) ΓNt (NE) γ¯
MNt
B α
Nt
×
(
M∑
ω=0
(
M
ω
)(
2Rs − 1
)M−ω
Γ (NE + ω)
(
γ¯E2
Rs
(
1− λ2e
))ω
×2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
))Nt
+ o
(
γ¯−MNtB
)
. (53)
As NE = 1, eq. (53) can be simplified as
P TAS
′
out MRC (Rs) =
1
(det (U ))Nt
(
γ¯E
γ¯B
)MNt
×

M∑
k=0
1
(M − k)!

2Rs
(
M∑
m=1
η2m(1−λ2e)
1−η2m + 1
)
(
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m + 1
)

k (
2Rs − 1
γ¯E
)M−k

Nt
+ o
(
γ¯−MNtB
)
. (54)
From (53) and (54), we can easily find the secrecy diversity order is MNt, which does not
depend on the eavesdropper antenna number NE . To further investigate the impact of NE on the
SOP, with γ¯E  1, eq. (53) can be rewritten as
P TAS
′
out MRC (Rs) =
Γ
Nt (NE +M) 2
RsMNt (γ¯E (1− λ2e))MNt(
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)
)Nt
ΓNt (M + 1) ΓNt (NE) γ¯
MNt
B α
Nt
×
(
2F1
(
1, NE +M ;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
))Nt
+ o
(
γ¯−MNtB
)
(55)
which will be used to discuss the gap of different TAS schemes.
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
20
2) SC at the Legitimate Receiver: Similar to MRC, according to (26), the asymptotic SOP
of TAS/SC is given by
P TAS
′
out SC (Rs) =
 1( M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)
)
Γ (NE) γ¯MB α

Nt (
M∑
ω=0
(
M
ω
)(
2Rs − 1
)M−ω
Γ (NE + ω)
×
(
γ¯E2
Rs
(
1− λ2e
))ω
2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
))Nt
+ o
(
γ¯−MNtB
)
. (56)
3) EGC at the Legitimate Receiver: Similar to MRC, according to (28), the asymptotic SOP
of TAS/EGC is given by
P TAS
′
out EGC (Rs) =
 (2M)
M(
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)
)
Γ (2M + 1) Γ (NE) γ¯MB α

Nt
×
(
M∑
ω=0
(
M
ω
)(
2Rs − 1
)M−ω
Γ (NE + ω)
(
γ¯E2
Rs
(
1− λ2e
))ω
×2F1
(
1, NE + ω;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α (1− λ2e)
))Nt
+ o
(
γ¯−MNtB
)
. (57)
As Nt = 1, eqs. (53), (56), and (58) specialize to (45), (48), and (49), respectively. Note that
when ηm = 1, and λe = 1, all the channels are fully correlated. In this case, the SOP of
TAS/MRC is given by
P TAS
′
out =
(
1− exp
(
− 2
Rs − 1
εγ¯B − 2RsNE γ¯E
))Nt
(58)
where ε is equal to M for EGC and MRC, and equal to 1 for SC. The inequality εγ¯B > 2RsNE γ¯E
is required for (58); otherwise, secrecy can not be guaranteed.
C. Discussion
TAS with eavesdropper’s CSI requires the transmitter to obtain instantaneous CSI for all
channels, but TAS without eavesdropper’s CSI only requires the main channels instantaneous
CSI. In addition, it can be seen from (44)-(58) that with or without eavesdropper’s CSI, regardless
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which combining scheme is deployed, the secrecy diversity order is MNt. The difference lies
in the secrecy array gain. As γ¯E  1, the ratio of (45) and (55) can be written as
P TASout MRC (Rs)
P TAS
′
out MRC (Rs)
=
Γ (MNt +NE) Γ
Nt−1 (NE)
ΓNt (M +NE)

(
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m +
NEλ
2
e
1−λ2e
)
(
1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m
)

Nt−1
× 2
F1
(
1,MNt +NE;NE;
NEλ
2
e
α(1−λ2e)
)
(
2F1
(
1,M +NE;NE;
NEλ2e
α(1−λ2e)
))Nt . (59)
In (59), the first part can be expressed as
Γ (MNt +NE) Γ
Nt−1 (NE)
ΓNt (M +NE)
=
(MNt +NE − 1) · · · (NE + 1)NE︸ ︷︷ ︸
MNt
×ΓNt (NE)
(M +NE − 1) · · · (NE + 1)NE︸ ︷︷ ︸
M

Nt
× ΓNt (NE)
≥ 1. (60)
Note in (60) as Nt = 1, the equality is satisfied. Moreover, the second part of (59),1+
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m
+
NEλ
2
e
1−λ2e
1+
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m

Nt−1
, is also larger than 1, and the third part
2F1
(
1,MNt+NE ;NE ;
NEλ
2
e
α(1−λ2e)
)
(
2F1
(
1,M+NE ;NE ;
NEλ
2
e
α(1−λ2e)
))Nt ' 1.
Obviously, the gap is increased with Nt. For the special case of NE = 1, eq. (59) is simplified
to
P TASout MRC (Rs)
P TAS
′
out MRC (Rs)
=
(MNt)!
(M !)Nt
(61)
where the identity 2F1 (−n, 1; 1;−z) = (1 + z)n is used [28, eq. (9.121.1)] to obtain (61). Similar
to (60), we have (MNt)! ≥ (M !)Nt . Then P TASout MRC (Rs) ≥ P TAS′out MRC (Rs). In addition, with
SC and EGC at the legitimate receiver, using (48), (49), (56), and (58), similar analytical results
can be obtained. Due to space limitation, we omit the analyse here.
Remark 5: The SOP of TAS with eavesdropper’s CSI outperforms the case without eaves-
dropper’s CSI, regardless which combining scheme is deployed at the legitimate receiver. As
γ¯B →∞, the SOP gap with eavesdropper CSI and without eavesdropper CSI is increased with
Nt, and it has no relationship with NE .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical and simulation results to verify our analysis. All the
links are assumed to experience Rayleigh flat fading. Without loss of generality, we set Rs = 1
bit/sec/Hz.
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Fig. 2. The SOP versus γ¯B under the case of CMC. M = 3, Nt = 1, NE = 1, λe = 0, and γ¯E = 10 dB.
When the multi-antenna main channels are correlated and independent of the eavesdropper
channel, the SOPs of MRC, SC, and EGC are plotted in Fig. 2, where U 1 denotes the correlation
matrix at the multi-antenna legitimate receiver, and it is given by
U 1 =

1 0.765 −0.8075
0.765 1 −0.8550
−0.8075 −0.8550 1
 (62)
where det(U 1) = 0.088. In U 1, the coefficients η1 = 0.8, η2 = 0.85, η3 = −0.95. U 2 denotes
the case that the main channels are completely correlated, namely ηm = 1. The curves named
independent in Fig. 2 represent the case when all the channels are independent. We can find
that compared to the case where main channels are independent, CMC degrades the SOP. This
is because when the main channels are independent, i.e. ηm = 0, the determinant of correlation
matrix is 1, and is greater than det(U 1). Namely, antenna correlation at the legitimate receiver
has a negative effect on SOP, as shown in Remark 1. In addition, we can observe that MRC
is better than EGC and SC except for the completely correlated case. It is because when the
main channels are completely correlated, only one effective channel plays a role for diversity
reception. Thus, for the completely correlated case, SC, EGC and MRC have the same SOP
performance. Also, it can be seen that simulation results coincide with the analytical results.
When γ¯B is increased, the asymptotic results converge to the simulation and analytical results,
which verifies our analysis.
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Fig. 3. The lower and upper bounds of SOP versus γ¯B . M = 3, Nt = 1, NE = 1, and γ¯E = 5 dB.
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Fig. 4. The impact of λe on SOP. M = 3, Nt = 1, γ¯B = 20 dB, and γ¯E = 3 dB.
The lower and upper bounds of SOP for MRC, SC, and EGC are illustrated in Fig. 3. The
main channel correlation matrix is U 1. We can observe that the SOP with λe = 1 is clealy
better than that with λe = 0, which verifies our prediction that the correlation between the main
channels and eavesdropper channels has a positive impact on SOP when the average SNR at the
legitimater receiver is larger than that at the eavesdropper. When γ¯B is increased, the simulation
results converge to the asymptotic results. In addition, it can be found that all the asymptotic
curves have the same slope. This is because all the combining schemes have the same secrecy
diversity order M , as predicted by our analysis.
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Fig. 5. The SOP of TAS without the eavesdropper’s CSI. λe = 0.8, Nt = 2, and γ¯E = 5 dB.
The impact of λe on SOP is examined in Fig. 4, where the dashed line denotes the scenario
when all the channels are correlated and the main channels correlation matrix is U 3; the solid
line denotes the scenario all channels are independent. U 3 is given by
U 3 =

1 −0.42 0.48
−0.42 1 −0.56
0.48 −0.56 1
 . (63)
In U 3, the correlation coefficients are η1 = 0.6, η2 = −0.7, η3 = 0.8, and det(U 3) = 0.5054.
It can be seen that as λe is small, the SOP performance of the scenario when all the channels
are independent is better than the scenario when all the channels are correlated. But as λe is
increased, the contrary result is obtained. In other words, the SOP when all the channels are
correlated can be lower than that when all the channels are independent, which agree with the
discussion in Remark 3.
For different number of antennas at the eavesdropper, with or without the eavesdropper’s CSI,
the SOPs of TAS with MRC, SC, and EGC are illustrated in Fig. 5, where the main channel
correlation matrix is U 1. The SOP is increased when the number of antennas at the eavesdropper
is increased, which verifies our secrecy analysis in Section IV. Also, we can observe all the curves
have the same slope. It is because no matter with or without eavesdropper’s CSI, the secrecy
diversity order is NtM and has no relationship with NE .
When multiple antennas are deployed at the transmitter and the eavesdropper, the SOPs of
TAS/MRC with or without eavesdropper’s CSI are plotted in Fig. 6, where the main channels have
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Fig. 6. The SOP of TAS/MRC with or without the eavesdropper’s CSI. M = 3, NE = 3, λe = 0.5, and γ¯E = 5 dB.
correlation matrix U 3. It can be seen that the SOP of TAS with eavesdropper’s CSI outperforms
that without eavesdropper’s CSI. This is because TAS with eavesdropper selects the antenna
according to the maximum secrecy capacity. Also, we can find that as Nt = 1, TAS with
eavesdropper’s CSI has the same SOP as TAS without eavesdropper’s CSI as expected. The gap
of SOP for the two TAS cases is increased with Nt, which verifies our analysis in Remark 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered a comprehensive secure communication system model with generalized cor-
relation structure. The impacts of both antenna correlation and channel correaltion between the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper on the SOP were investigated and quantified in detail. The
findings suggest that the antenna correlation at the legitimate receiver alone is detrimental to the
SOP. However, when the average SNR at the legitimate is greater than that at the eavesdropper, the
correlation between the main and eavesdropper’s channels can enhance the SOP. Finally, for an
eavesdropper with multiple antennas, the gaps of SOP for TAS with and without eavesdropper’s
CSI increase with the number of transmitter antennas.
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APPENDIX A
APPROXIMATE CONDITIONAL PDF OF γMRCsn,B
Assuming T = X2n,0 + Y
2
n,0, Xn,0 = x0, and Yn,0 = y0. Conditioned on x
2
0 + y
2
0 = t, the MGF
of γMRCsn,B can be expressed as [38]
φγmrcsn,B|T (s |t) = E
(
exp
(
−s
M∑
m=1
γsn,bm
)∣∣∣∣∣ t
)
=
M∏
m=1
E (exp (−sγsn,bm)| t)
=
M∏
m=1
φγsn,bm|T (s |t) (64)
where φγsn,bm|T (s |t) denotes MGF of γsn,bm conditioned on T . Note that the conditional PDF
of γsn,bm can be obtained by differentiating (22) with respect to y, and it is given by
fγsn,bm |T (y |t) =
exp
(
− η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
exp
(
− y
γ¯B (1− η2m)
)
I0
2
√√√√ η2mty
γ¯B(1− η2m)2
 . (65)
According to (65), the MGF of γsn,bm conditioned on T can be calculated as
φγsn,bm|T (s |t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−syfγsn,bm|T (y| t) dy
=
exp
(
− η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
(
s+
1
γ¯B (1− η2m)
)
y
)
I0
2
√√√√ η2mty
γ¯B(1− η2m)2
 dy
=
exp
(
−
(
η2mγ¯Bts
(1+sγ¯B(1−η2m))
))
γ¯B (1− η2m) s+ 1
. (66)
As γ¯B →∞, sγ¯B (1− η2m) 1. Thus the asymptotic conditional MGF of γsn,bm is
φγsn,bm |T (s |t) '
exp
(
−
(
η2mt
(1−η2m)
))
γ¯B (1− η2m) s
. (67)
Then, the asymptotic conditional MGF γMRCsn,B can be obtained as
φγMRCsn,B |T (s |t) =
exp
(
− M∑
m=1
η2mt
(1−η2m)
)
γ¯MB
M∏
m=1
1
(1− η2m) sM
. (68)
Performing the inverse Laplace transform for (68), we obtain the conditional PDF of γMRCsn,B as
fγMRCsn,B |T (x |t) = L
−1
(
φγMRCsn,B |T (s |t)
)
=
exp
(
− M∑
m=1
η2mt
(1−η2m)
)
M∏
m=1
1
(1−η2m)x
M−1
Γ (M) γ¯B
M . (69)
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APPENDIX B
APPROXIMATE CONDITIONAL PDF OF γEGCsn,B
According to (27), to derive the PDF of γEGCsn,B , we are required to derive the PDF of
√
γEGCsn,B .
Let Z =
√
γEGCsn,B =
M∑
m=1
√
γsn,bm
M
, conditioned on x20 + y
2
0 = t, the MGF of Z is given by
φZ|T (s |t) = E
(
exp
(
−s
(
M∑
m=1
√
γsn,bm
M
))∣∣∣∣∣ t
)
=
M∏
m=1
E
(
exp
(
−s
√
γsn,bm
M
)∣∣∣∣ t)
=
M∏
m=1
φ√
γsn,bm
M
∣∣∣∣T (s| t) (70)
where φ√
γsn,bm
M
∣∣∣∣T (s| t) denotes the MGF of
√
γsn,bm
M
conditioned on T . According to (65),
performing a variable transformation, and the PDF of √γsn,bm conditioned on T is given by
f√γsn,bm |T (x |t) =
2 exp
(
− η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
x exp
(
− x
2
γ¯B (1− η2m)
)
I0
2
√√√√ η2mtx2
γ¯B(1− η2m)2
 . (71)
Thus, φ√
γsn,bm
M
∣∣∣∣T (s| t) can be calculated as
φ√
γsn,bm
M
∣∣∣∣T (s| t) =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− sx√
M
)
f√γsn,bm|T (x| t)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− sx√
M
)
2 exp
(
− η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
x exp
(
− x
2
γ¯B (1− η2m)
)
I0

√√√√ η2mtx2
γ¯B (1− η2m)
 dx. (72)
As γ¯B → ∞, I0
(√
η2mtx
2
γ¯B(1−η2m)
)
' 1, and exp
(
− x2
γ¯B(1−η2m)
)
' 1. Thus, the MGF of
√
γsn,bm
M
conditioned on T is approximated as
φ√
γsn,bm
M
∣∣∣∣T (s| t) '
∫ ∞
0
x exp
(
− sx√
M
)
2 exp
(
− η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯B (1− η2m)
dx =
2M exp
(
− η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯B (1− η2m) s2
. (73)
Substituting (73) into (70), we obtain
φZ|T (s| t) '
(2M)M exp
(
− M∑
k=1
η2mt
1−η2m
)
γ¯MB
M∏
k=1
(1− η2m) s2M
. (74)
Performing the inverse Laplace transform of (75), we obtain the PDF of Z conditioned on T as
fZ|T (z| t) '
(2M)M exp
(
− M∑
k=1
η2mt
1−η2m
)
z2M−1
Γ (2M) γ¯MB
M∏
k=1
(1− η2m)
. (75)
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Since γEGCsn,B = Z
2, after a proper transformation, the PDF of γEGCsn,B conditioned on T is
fγEGCsn,B |T (x| t) '
(2M)M exp
(
− M∑
m=1
η2mt
1−η2m
)
xM−1
2Γ (2M)γ¯MB
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)
. (76)
C APPROXIMATE JOINT PDF OF γMRCsn∗,B AND γ
MRC
sn∗,E
The PDF of γMRCsn∗,B is given by
fγMRCsn∗,B
(x) = Nt
(
FγMRCsn,B
(x)
)Nt−1
fγMRCsn,B
(x) . (77)
Then, the joint PDF of γMRCsn∗ ,B and γ
MRC
sn∗ ,E is calculated as
fγMRCsn∗ ,B ,γ
MRC
sn∗ ,E
(x, y) =
fγMRCsn,B ,γ
MRC
sn,E
(x, y)
fγMRCsn,B
(x)
Nt
(
FγMRCsn,B
(x)
)Nt−1
fγMRCsn,B
(x)
= NtfγMRCsn,B ,γ
MRC
sn,E
(x, y)
(
FγMRCsn,B
(x)
)Nt−1
(78)
where, with the help of (42), the joint PDF of γMRCsn,B and γ
MRC
sn,E can be written as
fγMRCsn,B ,γ
MRC
sn,E
(x, y) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−t)fγMRCsn,B |T (x| t) fγMRCsn,E |T (y| t) dt
=
∫ ∞
0
M∏
m=1
1
1−η2m
Γ (M) γ¯MB
xM−1
1
γ¯E (1− λ2e)
(
y
NE γ¯Eλ2et
)NE−1
2
× exp
(
−t−
M∑
m=1
η2mt
1− η2m
− NEλ
2
et
(1− λ2e)
)
INE−1
2
√√√√ NEλ2ety
γ¯E (1− λ2e)2
 dt
=
(
1
1−λ2e
)NE
xM−1yNE−1 exp
( −y
γ¯E(1−λ2e)
)
M∏
m=1
(1− η2m)Γ (M) γ¯MB γ¯NEE Γ (NE)α
1F1
(
1;NE;
NEλ
2
ey
αγ¯E (1− λ2e)2
)
+ o
(
xM−1
γ¯MB
)
(79)
where α = 1 +
M∑
m=1
η2m
1−η2m +
NEλ
2
e
(1−λ2e) . Both identities [28, eq. (6.643.2)] and [28, eq. (9.220.2)] are
used for obtaining (79). Integrating (69) with respect to (w. r. t) t, we can obtain an approximate
CDF of γMRCsn,B as
FγMRCsn,B
(x) =
xM
M ! det (U) γ¯MB
+ o
(
xM
γ¯MB
)
. (80)
Substituting (80) and (79) into (78), the asymptotic joint PDF of γMRCsn∗,B and γ
MRC
sn∗,E can be
obtained as (43).
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